Abstract. In this paper, we will introduce the general concepts of generalized multiobjective game, generalized weight Nash equilibria and generalized Pareto equilibria. Next using the fixed point theorems due to Idzik [5] and Kim-Tan [6], we shall prove the existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria under general hypotheses. And as applications of generalized weight Nash equilibria, we shall prove the existence of generalized Pareto equilibria in non-compact generalized multiobjective game.
Introduction
Recently, the study of existence of Pareto equilibria in game theory with vector payoffs has been extensively studied by a number of authors, e.g., see [2] [3] [4] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] and the references therein. The motivation for the study of multicriteria models can be found in [2, 7] and the existence of Pareto equilibria is one of the fundamental problem in the game theory. In a recent paper [12] , Yu and Yuan proved some existence theorems of Pareto equilibria by using the fixed point theorem and the minimax inequality; and hence they provided an unified study for the existence of Pareto equilibria in multiobjective game under weaker conditions. Those results further generalize the corresponding existence results of Pareto equilibria given in the currently existing literatures. Also, in recent papers [14, 15] , Ding obtained some existence of equilibria for generalized multiobjective games by using some coercivity conditions and quasi-variational inequalities.
In this paper, we will introduce the general concepts of generalized multiobjective game, generalized weight Nash equilibria and generalized Pareto equilibria. Next using the fixed point theorems due to Idzik [5] and Kim-Tan [6] , we shall prove the existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria under general hypotheses. And as applications of generalized weight Nash equilibria, we shall prove the existence of generalized Pareto equilibria in non-compact generalized multiobjective game.
Preliminaries
We begin with some notations and definitions. Let A be a subset of a topological space X. We shall denote by 2 (y) := {x ∈ X | y ∈ T (x)} the lower section of T . Let X be a non-empty convex subset of a vector space E and let f : X → R. We say that f is quasiconvex if for each t ∈ R, {x ∈ X | f (x) ≤ t} is convex; and that f is quasi-concave if −f is quasi-convex. A correspondence T : X → 2 
And we say that T is continuous if T is both upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous.
Next we recall the following continuity definitions of the real-valued function. Let X be a non-empty subset of a topological space E and f : X → R. We say that f is upper semicontinuous if for each t ∈ R, {x ∈ X | f (x) ≥ t} is closed in X, and f is lower semicontinuous if −f is upper semicontinuous. Hence if f is upper semicontinuous, then the set {x ∈ X | f (x) < t} is open for each t ∈ R. And we say that f is continuous if f is both upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous.
We also recall the following: let E be a Hausdorff topological vector space. A set B ⊂ E is said to be convexly totally bounded (simply, c.t.b.) whenever for every neighborhood V of 0 ∈ E, there exists a finite subset {x i | i ∈ I} ⊂ E and a finite family of convex sets
Then it is known that every compact subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space is convexly totally bounded. For details, see Idzik [5] .
First, we shall introduce the generalized game with multicriterior (or generalized multiobjective game ) in its strategic form of a finite (or infinite) number of players G := (X i , F i , T i ) i∈I , where I is a (possibly uncountable) set of players, as follows: For each i ∈ I, X i is the set of strategies in a Hausdorff topological vector space E i for the player i, and If an action x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X is played, each player i is trying to find his/her payoff function
, which consists of noncommensurable outcomes under the possible constraint sets T i (x). Here it should be remarked that in our constrained multiobjective games, the other players can influence the j-th player (1) indirectly, by restricting j's feasible strategies to T j (x), (2) directly, by affecting j's payoff function F j . Here it is noted that every action domain of the constraint correspondence T j for each j ∈ I is not the set Xî but the whole strategy set X. In fact, it is reasonable that everyone can choose a possible action in his strategies which are affected by the other's strategies depending on his actions simultaneously; and this is different from the definitions of Ding [14, 15] using different constraint correspondences.
Each player i has a preference ' i ' over the outcome space R k i . For each player i ∈ I, its preference ' i ' is given by 
Also we assume that the model of a game in this paper is a noncooperative game, i.e., there is no replay communicating between players, and so players act as free agents, and each play is trying to minimize his/her own payoff according to his/her preferences and constraints.
For the games with vector payoff functions (or multicriteria) it is well-known that in general, there does not exist a strategyx ∈ X to minimize (or equivalently to say, maximize) all f i j s for each player i in his/her constraint, e.g., see [11] and the references therein. Hence we shall need some solution concepts for generalized multicriteria games.
Throughout this paper, for each m ∈ N, we shall denote by R m + the non-negative orthant of R m , i.e., 
. . ,x n ) ∈ X; then we will introduce the following general equilibrium concept of a generalized multiobjective game: Definition 1. A strategyxî ∈ Xî of the player i is said to be a generalized Pareto efficient strategy (respectively, generalized weak Pareto efficient strategy) of a game
and there is no strategy x i ∈ T i (x) such that
Then a strategyx ∈ X is said to be a generalized Pareto equilibrium (respectively, generalized weak Pareto equilibrium) of a game G =
, T i ) i∈I if, for each player i,xî ∈ Xî is a generalized Pareto efficient strategy (respectively, generalized weak Pareto efficient strategy) respect tox.
The above definition generalizes the corresponding definitions in [9, 10, 12] . And Definition 1 is different from the definition of Ding [14, 15] using different constraint correspondences.
From the above definition, it is clear that every generalized Pareto equilibria is a Pareto equilibria when the constraint set is fixed with T i (x) = X i for each x ∈ X and i ∈ I. And it is also clear that a generalized Pareto equilibria is a generalized weak Pareto equilibria, and in turn also a weak Pareto equilibria. However the converse is not always true, e.g., see [12] .
We also introduce the following definition which generalizes the definition in [9] : Definition 2. A strategyx ∈ X is said to be a generalized weight Nash equilibrium respect to the weight vector W :
+ for all i ∈ I, the strategyx ∈ X is said to be a normalized form of generalized weight Nash equilibrium respect to the weight W , where
+ \ {0} be fixed. Then, from the above definitions, it is easy to see that a strategyx ∈ X is a generalized weight Nash equilibrium respect to the weight vector W :
, T i ) i∈I , if and only if for each i ∈ I,xî is an optimal solution of the following vector optimization problem:
Existence of generalized weight Nash equilibria
In order to obtain the existence of generalized weight Nash equilibria and generalized Pareto equilibria, we shall need some fixed point theorems or minimax inequalities as efficient proving tools. First we shall investigate the existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria under general hypotheses by using the fixed point theorems due to Idzik [5] and Kim-Tan [6] . And in the next section, we shall show that generalized Pareto equilibria problem can be reduced to the study of generalized weight Nash equilibria under suitable conditions in non-compact generalized multiobjective game. Now we discuss the existence of generalized weight Nash equilibria as application of fixed point theorem as follows:
and
where
Then we prove that the existence of generalized weight Nash equilibria is equivalent to the existence of fixed points for the correspondence M W as follows: 
Lemma 1. Let I be a finite set of players, and let
for all y i ∈ T i (x). Sincex is the fixed point for M W , we havex ∈ T (x). If we choose any action y having the form y = (x 1 , . . . ,
and hence for all y i ∈ T i (x), we have
Therefore we have that for each i ∈ I,
Thereforex is the generalized weight Nash equilibrium respect to the weight W . ⇒: Suppose thatx is the generalized weight Nash equilibrium respect to the weight W . Thenx ∈ T (x) and
By the definition of the correspondence M W , we conclude thatx is a fixed point of the correspondence M W . This completes the proof.
Remarks. (1) Lemma 1 generalizes the corresponding Lemma 2.3 in [9] . And Lemma 1 enables us to investigate the generalized weight Nash equilibria by using appropriate fixed point theorems.
(2) In Lemma 1, the set of players is finite. However, if the convergence is well equipped in strategy sets (e.g., X i is a subset of an l 2 space with inner product), then the infinite set of players is possible.
Before proving existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria, we shall need the following general fixed point theorems of two different types.
We begin with the following particular form of Idzik's theorem [5, Theorem 4.3]:
Lemma 2 [5] . Let X be a convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E. Let T : X → 2 X be an upper semicontinuous correspondence such that T (x) is non-empty closed convex for each x ∈ X. If T (X) is a compact and convexly totally bounded subset of X, then there exists a pointx ∈ X such thatx ∈ T (x).
Lemma 3 [6] . Let X be a non-empty convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E and D be a non-empty compact subset of X.
be a correspondence satisfying the following:
Then there exists a pointx ∈ X such thatx ∈ co T (x). Now we are ready to prove the existence theorem for a generalized weight Nash equilibria in a general Hausdorff topological vector space. 
Theorem 1. Let I be a set of finite number of players and let
Then there exists a generalized weight Nash equilibriumx ∈ X for the game G respect to the weight vector W = (W 1 , . . . , W n ).
Proof. We shall apply Lemma 2 to the correspondence M
where Next, we shall prove a generalized weight Nash equilibrium in a Hausdorff topological vector space without assuming the local convexity of the constraint sets. Before proving this, we shall need the following: Then the function φ : X → R, defined by
is a continuous function on X.
Proof. By Theorem 2.5.1 in [1] , φ is upper semicontinuous; and by Theorem 2.5.2 in [1] , φ is lower semicontinuous. Thus φ is a continuous function on X. Now we prove a generalized weight Nash equilibrium in a general Hausdorff topological vector space as follows:
Theorem 2. Let I be a set of finite number of players and let
G = (X i , F i , T i ) i∈I be a
generalized multiobjective game, where for each i ∈ I, X i is a non-empty compact convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E i . Let T i : X → 2 X i be an upper semicontinuous constraint correspondence such that each T i (x) is a non-empty closed convex subset of X i and T

−1 i (y i ) is (possible empty) open in X for each y i ∈ X i . If there exists a weight vector
Proof. For each k ∈ N, we define a correspondence
for each x ∈ X. Then we have that for each x ∈ X,
and each S k (x) is non-empty convex by the assumption (2) . Note that for each y ∈ X, we have
Using Lemma 4, we can obtain S
is open in X by the continuity assumption (1) and the open lower section assumption on T i . Therefore the whole assumptions of Lemma 3 are satisfied, so that S k has a fixed point x(k) ∈ X. From the definition of S k , it follows that for each i ∈ I,
Here we note that since each T i has open lower sections, T i is lower semicontinuous, and so the correspondence T i must be continuous. Since X is compact, we can assume that the sequence {x(k)} in X converges tox ∈ X without loss of generality. Since x i (k) ∈ T i (x(k)) and T i is continuous for each i ∈ I, we havex i ∈ T i (x) for each i ∈ I. By the assumption (1) and Lemma 4 again, we have that
Therefore we have
Thusx is a generalized weight Nash equilibrium for the game G respect to the weight vector W = (W 1 , . . . , W n ). This completes the proof.
It is clear that Theorem 2 is closely related to Theorem 1 as a special case of the continuity and convexity of the mapping S W in Theorem 1. In fact, the correspondence S W in Theorem 1 automatically satisfy the continuity assumption by the corresponding hypothesis (1) of Theorem 2; however the converse does not hold in general.
Our Theorems 1 and 2 generalize the corresponding results in [9, 12] in several aspects as follows:
(1) when the constraint correspondence T i is constant, i.e., T i (x) = X i for each i ∈ I and x ∈ X, Theorem 1 reduces to the corresponding Theorem 1 in [12] , and so the corresponding theorems in [9] can be obtained;
(2) the strategy set X i need not be compact as in the corresponding theorems in [12] nor X i need not be a subset of a normed linear spaces as in [9] .
As we have seen, we have proved two existence results of generalized weight Nash equilibria as applications of fixed point theorems, and those results can be useful in showing the existence of equilibrium actions under the appropriate constraint sets.
The following lemma is an easy consequence of the quasi-variational inequality due to Yuan-Tarafdar [13] , and it is the basic tool for proving the existence of generalized weight Nash equilibria: 
Then there exists a pointx ∈ X such that
We also need the following lower semicontinuity property: f (x, y), for each x ∈ X, is a lower semicontinuous function on X.
Proof. By applying Theorem 2.5.2 in [1] to −f , we can obtain the conclusion. Now we will prove an existence theorem of a generalized weight Nash equilibrium as follows: 
Proof. In order to apply the quasi-variational inequality, we first define a real-valued function φ :
Then by the assumptions (1) - (3) and the fact that finite sum of lower semicontinuous functions is also lower semicontinuous, we can have (a) for each fixed y ∈ X, x → φ(x, y) is lower semicontinuous; (b) for each fixed x ∈ X, y → φ(x, y) is quasi-concave.
Since the correspondence T (x) := Π i∈I T i (x) is lower semicontinuous and the map φ is jointly lower semicontinuous, by Lemma 6, the map x → sup y∈T (x) φ(x, y) is lower semicontinuous and hence the set
Therefore the whole assumptions of Lemma 5 are satisfied, and so there exists a pointx ∈ X such that
for all y ∈ T (x). Then for each i ∈ I and every (xî,
Thusx is a generalized weight Nash equilibrium point of the game G respect to the weight vector W .
Remarks.
(1) Theorem 3 generalizes the corresponding results in [9, 10, 12] . In fact, when the constraint correspondence T i is constant, i.e., T i (x) = X i for each i ∈ I and x ∈ X, our Theorem reduces to the corresponding Theorem 1 in [12] , and so the corresponding theorems in [9, 10] can be obtained.
(2) We can obtain the existence of equilibria for generalized multiobjective games by using some coercivity conditions; and in this case, we can assure that the strategy set X i need not be compact as in the corresponding theorems in [12] nor X i need be a subset of a normed linear spaces as in [9, 10] .
(3) In recent papers [14, 15] , Ding obtained some existence of equilibria for generalized multiobjective games by using some coercivity conditions and quasi-variational inequalities, and those results are comparable to our existence results in this paper.
It is well-known that fixed point technique has wide applications in the study of economics and optimizations, e.g., see [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . On the other hand, in a recent paper [12] , Yu and Yuan proved the existence of weight Nash equilibria and Pareto equilibria by using Ky Fan's minimax inequality, which would not be widely used before as an efficient tool for investigating the equilibria in economics and optimizations. Furthermore, in this paper, it is our purpose to present how the quasi-variational inequality can be applied to the existence of generalized weight Nash equilibria, and this method can be considered as an efficient tool for the equilibrium theory.
Existence of generalized Pareto equilibria
In this section, as applications of generalized weight Nash-equilibria, we shall derive some existence theorems of generalized Pareto equilibria for generalized multiobjective games.
We now prove the following: 
is a generalized weak Pareto equilibrium (resp., a generalized Pareto equilibrium) of the game G.
Proof. Suppose the contrary, i.e.,x is not a generalized weak Pareto equilibrium. Then there exists some i ∈ I and an x i ∈ T i (x) such that
which contradicts the fact thatx is a normalized form of generalized weight Nash equilibrium respect to the weight W = (W 1 , . . . , W n ). Thereforex is a generalized weak Pareto equilibrium. Next, we assume that W i ∈ int T k i + for every i ∈ I. Suppose thatx is not a generalized Pareto equilibrium; then there exists some i ∈ I and an
which contradicts the definition of the corresponding generalized weight Nash equilibrium respect to the weight W = (W 1 , . . . , W n ). Hencex is a generalized weak Pareto equilibrium of the game G = (X i , F i , T i ) i∈I . This completes the proof.
Remarks. It should be noted that the conclusion of Lemma 7 still hold true whenx is a generalized weight Nash equilibrium respect to the weight
Also it should be noted that the converse of Lemma 7 is not true in general, i.e., a generalized Pareto equilibrium is not necessarily a generalized weight Nash equilibrium (e.g. see [9, 12] (1) and (2), it is easy to see that all the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are satisfied. Therefore the game G has a generalized weight Nash equilibriumx respect to the weight vector W . Since W i ∈ int T k i + for all i ∈ I, by Lemma 7,x is a generalized Pareto equilibrium for the game G. This completes the proof.
Following the method in [15] , we can further unify and generalize the above results in this paper to non-compact generalized multiobjective games in H-spaces without assuming the linear structure.
